Consumption theory posits that variation in marginal interest rates across consumers predicts spending responses to stimulus policies. We test this directly using administrative records with account level information about loans and deposits to measure the response to a Danish stimulus policy transforming illiquid pension wealth into liquid wealth. The data reveal substantial variation in marginal interest rates across consumers, and this predicts spending responses. Differences in interest rates across consumers cannot be explained by short-lived shocks appearing within the duration of a typical business cycle but is consistent with persistent heterogeneity, for example in the degree of impatience.
Introduction
Across the world, governments reacted to the large negative shock that hit the global economy in 2008 by adopting unprecedented fiscal stimulus policies, in many cases with the explicit aim of increasing household consumption to boost aggregate spending. Many empirical studies have documented that consumers do raise spending in response to stimulus policy, including recent studies by Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) These results are in contrast to the prediction of the Permanent Income Hypothesis/canonical Life-Cycle model with perfect capital markets where tax rebates just raise household savings, without having any stimulus effect on the economy. A standard explanation for this prediction failure of the basic Permanent Income Hypothesis is the prevalence of liquidity constraints (Zeldes, 1989) . If some households are constrained by lack of access to liquidity then stimulus policy reduces the tightness of the constraints and boosts the spending of these households. In this paper we employ a unique data set with information about all household borrowing and saving at the account level to provide a direct test of the importance of liquidity constraint tightness, and proceed to investigate why liquidity constraint tightness varies across consumers.
Liquidity constraints are difficult to identify empirically and previous studies of consumer responses to stimulus policy have used different types of proxies such as low household income, young persons and low liquid asset holdings to classify households as liquidity constrained Slemrod, 2003, 2009 Broda and Parker, 2014 ). However, a challenge for these studies is that differences in access to liquidity is one of degree and not of kind in that the tightness of liquidity constraints is a continuous variable reflecting how costly additional liquidity is to the consumer and it is this shadow value of liquidity that theoretically determines the propensity to consume (Browning and Lusardi, 1996) .
For example, one consumer may have collateral and borrow at a low interest rate, while another may have used up his collateral-backed line of credit and therefore pays a higher interest on the last dollar borrowed. We demonstrate in a basic consumption model how variation across consumers in the marginal interest rate observed prior to the stimulus policy, measuring liquidity constraint tightness, predicts variation in spending responses to stimulus policy.
We test this liquidity constraint hypothesis directly using a novel Danish data set containing third-party reported administrative records of all individual-level loan and deposit accounts that enables us to compute pre-reform consumer level marginal interest rates.
The data reveal substantial variation in the marginal interest rates paid by consumers, varying from close to 0 to more than 20 percent across people in our sample in 2008. We employ this data in an analysis of a Danish fiscal stimulus policy that allowed consumers to take out wealth from otherwise inaccessible pension accounts within a seven month window during 2009, thereby transforming illiquid pension wealth into liquid wealth available for spending. The policy changed the timing of access to wealth without affecting the level of wealth, making it ideal for testing the importance of liquidity constraints for spending responses to stimuli.
We measure the spending effect of the reform through a survey conducted in January 2010, immediately after the pay-out window had closed, resulting in about 5,000 completed interviews with information about spending behavior related to the pension payout. Our survey method follows previous studies (e.g., Slemrod, 2003, and Parker et al., 2013 ) and asks respondents directly about the change in their total spending, net saving and pension saving in 2009 due to the stimulus payment.
We match the survey data at the person level to the loan and deposit accounts data as well as to income tax records and other administrative registers containing information about demographics, incomes and wealth, and broad categories of financial asset holdings for the period 1998-2009. By comparing answers from the survey about the allocation of the payout on spending, net savings, and pension savings to corresponding measures constructed from the register data over several years surrounding the time of the stimulus reform, we show that respondents understand the counterfactual nature of the survey question.
We find that the variation in marginal interest rates across consumers, observed prior to the stimulus reform, is strongly significant in predicting the variation in spending responses, with a 1 percentage point difference in the interest rate between consumers being associated with a 0.5 percentage point difference in the propensity to spend. These findings are in line with the theory and suggest that liquidity constraints are important for explaining spending responses to stimulus policies, even if other factors, e.g. size effects, also turn out to be important for explaining the total response to the stimulus policy.
The substantial variation across consumers in pre-reform marginal interest rates, and therefore also in spending responses to the stimulus reform, may be due to idiosyncratic, temporary income shocks occurring in the downturn before the reform, or it may be due to persistent heterogeneity in the demand for liquidity, for example because of fixed differences in how consumers discount future consumption. We show that the marginal interest rate is strongly correlated with the ratio of liquid assets to income more than a decade earlier. This result indicates that differences in liquidity constraint tightness across consumers, observed just before the stimulus policy implementation, reflect heterogeneity across consumers that is permanent or persistent to a degree that cannot be accounted for by shocks appearing within the horizon of a typical business cycle.
Our results contribute in different ways to the literature measuring the effects of stimulus policies and the role of liquidity constraints. It is the first study that directly examines the role of variation in the cost of liquidity across consumers for the propensity to spend out of a stimulus. Johnson et al. (2006) estimate the change in consumption expenditures caused by the 2001 federal income tax rebates. They show that people with little liquid wealth are likely to spend more and point to liquidity constraints as a likely driver of spending responses. Souleles (1999) examines the effects of tax refunds and reach similar findings. We show that proxying liquidity constraints by the ratio of liquid assets to income does not capture the full underlying heterogeneity in liquidity constraint tightness, thereby underestimating its role in explaining consumption responses to stimulus policy. Agarwal et al. (2007) show, using credit card data, that consumers initially increased credit card payments but soon after increased spending following the 2001 US income tax rebate. Similarly, Agarwal and Qian (2014) use credit and debit card data and find that those with low bank balances and credit card limits respond more strongly to a Singaporean stimulus policy. The focus on credit card use is interesting because credit cards are likely to be the source of credit that carries the highest marginal cost of liquidity. The high frequency of the credit card data makes it possible to follow the short term dynamics of spending, but the Agarwal et al. and Agarwal and Qian studies do not have data on other household assets and spending and does not measure the cost of liquidity directly. Parker et al. (2013) investigate the effect of the 2008 tax rebate using the US consumer expenditure survey (CEX) and find that low income households tend to have a higher propensity to spend, but do not provide clear evidence for the importance of liquidity constraints. Broda and Parker (2014) , also measuring the effect of the 2008 tax rebate but using a larger data set based on scanner data, find that low liquid wealth households account for the majority of the spending response, but find no clear difference between low and high income households. There is, in fact, little consensus about the role of liquidity constraints for the propensity to spend out of stimuli. Slemrod (2003, 2009) and Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010) examine the effects of the 2001 and 2008 tax rebates using survey information and find that respondents with low income do not have a higher propensity to spend the stimulus. To the extent that income is an indicator of being affected by constraints, these results could be interpreted to mean that constraints are not important.
Our results potentially reconcile the disparate findings about the importance of liquidity constraints. Common to all these studies is that they do not have a precise measure of how binding liquidity constraints are. We find that the pre-reform marginal interest rates of consumers predict the spending responses to stimulus policy, also after controlling for various income measures, financial assets, expectations, size of the payout, age and other demographic characteristics. The marginal interest rate is correlated with the level of liquid assets but only weakly correlated with income. This may explain why studies using low income as an indicator for being liquidity constrained find that it is unimportant for consumption responses, while studies using low levels of liquid assets as an indicator find that liquidity constraints play an important role in explaining consumer behavior.
The finding of substantial heterogeneity in pre-reform marginal interest rates is also consistent with results from a broader literature about the role of liquidity constraints and consumption behavior, including Gross and Souleles (2002) and Leth-Petersen (2010), showing that changes in the supply of credit have an effect on consumption for some, but not all, groups of consumers.
None of the aforementioned studies analyze why some individuals are liquidity constrained while others are not. Our results point to permanent, or very persistent, heterogeneity across consumers that generate variation in liquidity constraint tightness and, therefore, also in spending responses to stimulus policy. While not identifying any particular model, such a pattern is consistent with theory of savings behavior where consumers are heterogeneous with respect to how they discount the future, including Mankiw's (2000) spenders-savers model of fiscal policy as well as recent empirical work by Alan and Browning (2010) that rejects homogeneity of discount factors, Hurst (2006) that presents empirical evidence consistent with the view that some agents discount the future heavily while others do not, and Carroll et al. (2013) that introduces a fixed idiosyncratic time preference factor into a buffer-stock model and is able to explain the US wealth distribution and the magnitude of responses to stimulus policies. The tax scheme involved a small wealth effect for high wage earners who could obtain a higher net wealth from taking the SP funds out and placing the funds in a private pension scheme if the rate of returns are expected to be the same on the two schemes. Let c 1 and c 2 denote the consumption levels of a household in period 1 and period 2, respectively, and assume that consumer behavior is governed by a standard homothetic utility function u (c 1 , c 2 ). 2 The consumer has both illiquid wealth and liquid wealth (which 2 Within the class of homothetic utility functions is the specification u (c 1 , c 2 ) = c
may be negative) at the beginning of period 1. Let y 1 denote the cash-on-hand in period 1 such as earnings and liquid wealth carried over from the previous period, and let a 1 denote illiquid consumer wealth which is not accessible before period 2, e.g. a positive balance on pension accounts that cannot be withdrawn or used as collateral for loans. The consumer budget constraint in period 1 then becomes
where d is consumer debt at the end of period 1 (or savings if d < 0). The consumption level in the second period has to fulfill
where y 2 is earnings and other non-capital income in period two,r is a fixed rate of return on illiquid wealth, andr is the average interest rate on consumer debt/savings. We assume that the interest rate on a new loan of the consumer r 
The consumer's optimum, illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2 for different types of preferences by the points X, Y and Z, is characterized by a standard tangency condition derived from eqs (1)- (3):
/ (1 − θ) commonly used in consumption theory and macro economics and where β is the subjective discount factor while θ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Note that since our focus is on predicting consumer behavior, this utility function may be different from the utility metric determining the well-being of the consumer due to present bias or other types of behavioral effects, without affecting the results.
where the interest rate on marginal lending r (d) depends on the consumption choice (through d), and where the marginal rate of substitution is a function only of relative consumption levels c 2 /c 1 because of the assumption of homothetic preferences. Note that the optimum condition (4) may be rewritten as
where ψ is the shadow price of liquidity (Browning and Lusardi, 1996) . This shows that a high marginal interest rate of the consumer, r (d), is equivalent to a high shadow price of liquidity, i.e. a tight liquidity constraint.
Now consider a fiscal stimulus policy that allows the consumer to transfer a certain amount of illiquid wealth a 1 to cash-on-hand wealth y 1 . We assume that the permitted transfer amount is small compared to total wealth allowing us to approximate the effect of the reform as a marginal change dx giving the consumer the opportunity to change the allocation of wealth between liquid and illiquid wealth according to
By differentiating equations (1)- (4) wrt. x and using the relationship (5), we obtain:
The household consumption response to the reform (5) is characterized
The effect of the reform is illustrated in Figure 2 . The reform expands the budget set of the consumer as illustrated by the gray curve. From expressions (1)- (3), it follows that the horizontal movement equals
, which shows that the expansion of the budget set is increasing in the pre-reform marginal interest rate. A more impatient person will be at Z, with a higher marginal interest rate before the reform, and move to Z', which gives a larger immediate consumption response to the stimulus policy. On the other hand, a person at point X where r (d) =r will not respond to the reform at all. This shows that variation in preferences across consumers create variation in consumer marginal interest rates before the stimulus reform and that this variation in liquidity constraint tightness is related to consumption responses, with larger responses for consumers with high pre-reform marginal interest rates. Our data reveals substantial variation in observed marginal interest rates across consumers. Two leading explanations for this variation are differences in preferences (patience and risk aversion) and differences in timing of income (Deaton, 1999) . In both cases, the basic theory predicts that the observed pre-reform variation in marginal interest rates, and therefore in liquidity constraint tightness, across consumers is positively related to the differences in consumption responses to fiscal stimulus policy.
Data
The measurement of consumer spending responses to the stimulus policy is based on survey data collected in January 2010 for a random sample of persons with SP-savings. For that purpose, we commissioned a survey company that asked individuals about their response to the SP-release. The survey data are joined at the individual level with third-party reported administrative register data from the Danish Tax Authorities containing information about loans, deposits and interest payments, used to compute marginal interest rates, as well as a host of background information from other administrative registers.
Survey data and the spending response to the stimulus policy
The -to reduce your debt;
-to increase your pension savings?
Respondents were sampled randomly from the entire set of SP-account holders. The response rate in the survey is 50 percent when including item-nonresponses among nonrespondents, resulting in 5,055 completed interviews. 5 We know the identity of nonrespondents and we are therefore able to characterize differences between respondents and nonrespondents in terms of the variables available in the population-wide administrative registers. In Appendix Table A1 we show that nonrespondents are on average slightly younger, slightly more likely to be single, renters, have lower income, and smaller SPaccounts. These differences are statistically significant but quantitatively small. 6 Based on the 2008 characteristics observed in the administrative registers, we have estimated the 4 The question is inspired by Slemrod (1995, 2003) . In section 5.1 we validate the survey answers against register data.
5 Two data sources that have been used extensively for measuring the effect of stimulus policies in the US are the CEX and the Michigan Survey of Consumers. The response rate in the CEX is 70-75% (http://www.bls.gov/cex/2012/csxintvw.pdf) and it is 40% in the Michigan Survey of Consumers (personal communication with the staff). 6 The fact that we have more owners among respondents could suggest that we have more wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers, cf. Kaplan and Violante (2014) , with high spendings rates. However, we note that the differences are small, and that participants do not have less fiancial assets suggesting that they are not likely to be more prone to behave as if liquidity constrained.
propensity to participate in the survey and recalculated our estimates weighting with the inverse of the probability that the observation is included. If the particpation decision is adequately captured by these charcteristics used for estimating the propensity score then this would give a consistent estimate of the effect in the population. The results from this exercise (not reported) did not deviate in any important way from the results presented in the paper.
The survey question allows respondents to distribute the stimulus across all alternatives. We use this information to calculate a marginal propensity to spend by putting the amount spent in proportion to the total pay-out. Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the propensity to spend against the size of the SP payout together with a local polynomial regression through the data. Most of the responses are corner solutions, either spend (63%) or not spend (33%). The smoothed regression shows that the propensity to spend is higher among respondents with small SP-accounts balances. as well as interest payments over the past year. 7 We use the information from these files to calculate the realized marginal interest rate before the reform for each person in our survey.
To do this we link the interview persons to any partners or spouses and calculate an interest rate for each and every account held by the household. One may argue that mortgage loan interest rates reflect little about the marginal cost of obtaining further credits since it depends mainly on the collateral and income at the time when the loan was established. However, it turns out that the results are nearly identical whether we include mortgage loans or not in the calculation of the marginal interest rate. The reported results are without mortgage loans. We perform the calculation at the household level to allow for the possibility that members of the household can shift funds within the household to obtain the lowest possible marginal interest rate.
8 Account specific interest rates are calculated as interest payments on loan l relative to average debt on loan l over the year:
account-specific interest rate from a loan account if the household has at least one loan account. If the household only has deposit accounts, we pick the smallest account-specific interest rate among the calculated account-specific interest rates for that household. The idea is that if a household has loan accounts then the cost of liquidity is determined by the highest interest rate, whereas the cost of liquidity is given by the account where the lowest return is earned when the household has only deposit accounts.
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The high level of detail in these data generates significant dispersion in marginal interest rates across persons. Figure 5 plots the distribution for our sample.
< Figure 5 >
The distribution is bimodal with the area around the lower modal point dominated by households that have only deposit accounts and the area around the upper modal point dominated by households that have loan accounts. The distribution shows that there is a significant heterogeneity in marginal interest rates in our sample. By calculating the interest rates, we potentially introduce a measurement error. However, our detailed account data includes a subset of accounts with information about the actual interest rates and this enables us to directly compare the calculated interest rates with actual interest 8 We also performed all calculations at the person level. This did not affect the results. 9 People may have been discouraged from borrowing and therefore effectively have faced a higher interest rate than what we calculate. To check for the importance of this we have included a question in the survey, where we ask if consumers have been rejected for a loan. Including this in the analysis did not change the results and it was itself insignificant.
rates to get an impression of the accuracy of our imputation. Figure 6 plots calculated interest rates against actual interest rates for the 1,435 observations where we have an actual interest rate that matches the computed marginal interest rate. The figure shows that the estimated interest rates match the actual interest rates quite well. 
Comparing survey answers to third-party reports from administrative registers
Our analysis combines survey responses with third-party information on actual behavior obtained from administrative registers. A standard concern with survey questions is whether they are able to capture the variation intended. In our case it is particularly important that the respondents understand the counterfactual nature of the questions, so that the answers reflect causal effects of the policy. We therefore start by comparing survey responses with net savings (comprising both savings and debt reduction), contributions to private pension savings accounts and imputed spending constructed from the records contained in administrative registers. The idea is that register and survey data provides two potentially noisy measures of the same object. If the noise in the two data sources is orthogonal then comparing the two measures should reveal if there is a signal.
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The administrative data contain information about bank deposits and bank debt (including credit card debt) recorded at the last day of the year. Net savings is hence measured as the difference in net bank assets, i.e. bank deposits minus bank debt, between time t and t − 1, and denoted ∆W it for individual i. Pension contributions are measured directly and we denote pension contributions by p it . Spending is not recorded in administrative data, but we construct a measure of spending, c it , by subtracting from disposable income, y it , the value of net savings and pension contributions, i.e. c it = y it − ∆W it − p it .
This imputation was proposed by Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003) who showed that
it, while noisy, performs well in terms of matching total expenditure in the Danish Expenditure Survey. To compare survey answers with the register based measures, we estimate equations of the following form:
where i is a person-identifier and t indicates the year running from 2005 to 2011. z
R it
is the measure constructed from information in administrative registers and z S i2009 is the corresponding measure collected from the survey about the response to the SP-payout in 2009. A characteristic of the register based measures of net savings and imputed spending is that they are quite noisy. The noise appears, for example, because the timing of spending in general is to some extent random, and this creates random variation in bank assets and debt. The survey data also contains noise, but of a different type that relates to recollection and rounding error. In practice the noise is substantial and a challenge to the exercise.
We do two things to reduce the impact of these noise components. One, we nomalize z that individuals who always have high spending/saving are the respondents who indicate spending/saving in the survey without having spent/saved any more than they always do, then estimates of β 1t should be at a constant level across all the years for which equation (7) Overall, the conclusion is that increases in spending/saving measured in the survey coincide with increases in spending/saving in the third party reported register data, suggesting that respondents understand the counterfactual nature of the question.
Cost of liquidity and the propensity to spend
The theory presented in section 3 showed that the propensity to spend the stimulus should be correlated with the observed pre-reform marginal interest rate. Figure 9 plots a local polynomial smooth of the propensity to spend against the marginal interest rate. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the figure shows a significant positive and almost linear relationship between the propensity to spend and the marginal interest rate, with a 1% point difference in the marginal interest rates between individuals being associated with a 0.5% point increase in the propensity to spend.
< Figure 9 >
In Table 1 we run corresponding OLS regressions and include more covariates. In column 4 we include a standard set of demographic covariates. This reduces the size of the parameter of interest to 0.33. According to the life cycle framework, agents that have a precautionary motive also adjust their behavior if they expect to be affected by constraints in the future. In column 5 we introduce a set of indicators for expected constraints. Specifically, in the survey we asked if people expect their chances of obtaining credit over the next year to be better or worse than in the previous year. Similarly, we asked about expectations over next year's income. Neither of these indicators turn out significant, even when testing for their joint significance. Finally, the SP-release was announced at the same time as a tax reform to be implemented from January 2010 aiming at increasing incentives to work. The tax reform was fully financed and lowered the highest marginal tax rate on wage income from 63 percent to 56 percent. In the survey we asked about subjective expectations regarding the permanent effects of the tax reform on the respondent's own income, and included two variables for this in the regression presented in column 5, but neither of these indicators were significant. 12 12 Browning and Crossley (2009) find evidence that when people face liquidity constraints they cut back on durable spending. In a follow-up question we asked: Concerning the part of the increase [in the sum of money that you have at your disposal ] that you allocated for spending, did you mainly spend it on: 1) large items (for example televisions, cars, white goods, computers, maintaining/improving the house) or unusual items (for example travels, nice clothes, eating at restaurants) 2) everyday spending (for example food ). 3) do not know. 67% of the spenders indicated that they had spent the money on large or unusual items. In a set of regressions (not reported), similar to the regressions presented in Table 1 but using an indicator for having spent the money on large or unusual items as the dependent variable, we confirm the results from Table 1 .
Across the regressions in Table 1 , we find that the marginal interest rate calculated from pre-reform information is significant, both statistically and economically, in explaining the propensity to spend the stimulus.
According to the theory the marginal interest rate should be better at predicting the stimulus response than the average interest rate. In Table 2 we therefore compare the ability of the average and the marginal interest rate to predict the spending response.
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Column 1 reproduces column 1 of Table 1 , and column 2 shows results for the average interest rate instead. The calculated average and marginal interest rates are, of course, correlated and the average interest rate is therefore able to pick up the effect from column 1. In column 3 both measures are included; here, the marginal interest rate is significant, while the average interest rate is insignificant. In columns 4-6 we repeat the estimations including the full set of covariates from column 5 of Table 1 and confirm these results.
< Table 2 >
Estimations are based on OLS, and this can potentially lead to biased estimates as most responses are either 0 or 1. To make sure that potential misspecification is not driving the results, we have also reproduced the results using probit and tobit estimators, which did not affect results (see Table A2 in the appendix). Furthermore, the specification presented in Table 1 includes linear terms only. Figure 4 suggested that the propensity to spend could be nonlinearly related to the size of the SP-payout. Another concern might be that the realized marginal interest rate is in fact just picking up variations in income across the persons/households in our sample. To address these concerns we repeated the estimations including up to 4th order polynomials in the size of the SP-payout, in all the income variables, and age. The inclusion of the polynomials affected the results only marginally. Results are reported in Table A3 in the appendix. We also did an analysis where the sample was split into four groups according to the income quartiles in 2008 and carried out regressions corresponding to column 5 in Table 1 separately for each of these four sub-groups. The estimated effect of the interest gradient was almost identical across the four subsamples confirming the observation that income is not a strong proxy for liquidity constraints; these results are not reported but available upon request. As an additional robustness check we also included respondents who did not take out the SP-funds as non-spenders, but this did not affect results either; this is reported in Table   A4 in the appendix. 14 This suggests that while liquidity constraints may be important in explaining the response, there are arguably other factors that are also important for explaining the response. One potential explanation for this pattern is related to the size of the SP-payout. Previous studies have found that the propensity to spend is high for small payout amounts but considerably smaller for large payout amounts. 15 The results reported in Table 1 suggest that size is important.
To get further insight into the importance of a size effect, we repeated the survey in January 2012 and asked hypothetical questions about what the spending response would have been had the SP-payout been 1,000 DKK, 10,000 DKK or 100,000 DKK (in random order). The follow-up survey includes 3,135 persons from the original survey and was supplemented with randomly selected new respondents to reach a total of 5,920 respondents.
We then matched these responses with the marginal interest rates from 2008 that we used in Figure 9 . The results are presented in Figure 10 and they show that the intercept, i.e. the spending response at a zero interest rate, varies considerably with the size of the 14 As noted earlier, 67% of the spenders indicated that their spending was mainly on large or unusual items. To the extent that such items are durable goods, actual consumption in 2009 will be lower. 15 For example, Hsieh (2003) finds that the propensity to consume out of (large and anticipated) payments from Alaska's Permanent Fund is smaller than the same individuals' propensity to consumer out of (small and irregular) income tax refunds.
hypothetical pay-out. Changing the size of the hypothetical pay-out from 1,000 to 10,000 to 100,000 changes the intercept from 60% to 40% to 25%. While we do not claim that this exhausts the list of explanations, these findings suggest that the level of the response is clearly affected by the size of the pay-out. Interestingly, the 2008 marginal interest rate gradient that we observed for the actual outcome in Figure 9 appears in all panels in Figure 10 as well. 16 It is also interesting to note, that the rate of extreme responses Table 3 presents the results from a multivariate analysis of the ability of historical asset levels to predict the current marginal interest rate. The first column in Table 3 repeats the estimation from column 5, Table 1 < Table 3 > One objection to this analysis could be that people observed with low levels of assets in 1998 have been exposed to continuing bad luck in the labor market over the period.
In columns 4 and 5 we therefore repeat the exercise on a subsample of people that have not been affected by unemployment at any point in the period 1998-2008. Results from this subsample, consisting of more than half of the sample used in the other estimations, confirm the previous findings. While these results do not rule out a role for historical shocks so persistent that they impact behavior more than ten years after they appeared, they suggest a role for heterogeneity that is persistent to a degree that cannot be accounted for by shocks appearing within the typical duration of a business cycle.
We have also conducted other robustness checks of the results presented in Table 3 . Spending, the interest rate and historical asset levels (1) (2) 
